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NOTES

the instant case that in such situations where there are two
equally innocent mortgagees, the first mortgagee should suffer
since by due care he could have determined whether or not his
mortgage was inscribed. 14 Since such reasoning has not been
deemed sufficient in the case of acts of conveyance it should not
be considered as sufficiently strong to justify destroying the uniformity of treatment for mortgages and conveyances which Act
215 of 1910 was designed to secure. As a practical matter, a
holding that mortgages take effect from filing would cause little
hardship, since in most parishes instruments are indexed as soon
as filed, and the index serves as the means of notice to third persons. The decision in the instant case perpetuates the illogical
and incongruous distinction between the effect of the filing of
mortgages and conveyances which existed before the passage of
the Act. It is to be hoped that when the Supreme Court has an
opportunity to consider the problem it will find such a restriction
unwarranted and will thereby achieve the uniformity which the
F. S. C., JR.
legislators sought.

TORTS-CONTRACTOR'S LIABILITY TO PERSONS NOT IN PRIVITY

HIM-In 1932, the defendant contractor repaired and reconstructed a building. Three years later, due to
defects in construction, the house collapsed and injured a guest
of the owner. The injured guest sued for damages under Article
2315 of the Civil Code.1 Held, the plaintiff cannot recover. The
defendant was not at fault since he owed no duty to one not in
privity of contract with him. Schott v. Ingargolia, 180 So. 462
(La. App. 1938).
OF CONTRACT WITH

The duty of a contractor to those not in privity with him
for injuries arising from defects in construction is nowhere defined in the Civil Code.2 This decision, in effect, looks back to
Winterbottom v. Wright.3 It is true that in the ancient common
14. White v. Union Bank, 6 La. Ann. 162 (1851); Charrier v. Greenlaw
Truck & Tractor Co., Inc., 2 La. App. 622 (1925).

1. Art. 2315; La. Civil Code of 1870: "Every act whatever of man that
causes damages to another, obliges him by whose fault it happened to
repair it . . ."

2. The court drew attention to the fact that, as this was an action
against the contractor and not against the owner, Arts. 670 and 2322, La.

Civil Code of 1870, were not applicable.
3. 10 M.&W. 109, 152 Eng. Reprint 402 (1842). The driver of a mailcoach,
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law every artificer was charged with the duty to use reasonable
care in the exercise of his trade.' Nevertheless, this duty was
severely limited by Winterbottom v. Wright which made privity
of contract a requisite for liability. Without this restriction, a
paralyzing legal responsibility would have fallen on infant industry, and therefore this rule was evolved as a concession to industrialism. There were two exceptions: first, where the article or
chattel sold was inherently dangerous, 5 and second, where the
8
manufacturer knew of the defect.

The theory of contractural relations as the sole basis for tort
liability in this situation was illogical and has not survived. There
is no doubt that the duty arises from a relation between the
parties, but the relationship need not be contractual. For example, it may be that of manufacturer-purchaser (although the
purchase was made through a retail distributor),' public weigherpurchaser (even though the weigher was hired by the seller),8
carrier-passenger,9 and bailor-bailee. 10
With industrial development, there occurred a general broadening of the exceptions to the rule that privity of contract was
requisite to liability. There is an increasing tendency to require
2
industry to pay its way.1' MacPherson v. The Buick Motor Co.1
18
and other cases have shown that liability for damage caused by
defective manufacture may arise even though the goods are not
inherently dangerous according to the old standard. Nor is it
who was injured as a result of defects in construction of the coach, could not
recover from the manufacturer who had sold the coach to the Postmaster
General, because of lack of privity of contract.
4. Bohlen, Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort (1905) 53 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 273.
5. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852).
6. Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 Fed. 865 (C.C.A. 8th,
1903).
7. In MacPherson v. The Buick Motor Co. 217 N.Y. 382, 390, 111 N.E. 1050,
1053, L.R.A. 1916F 696, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 440 (1916), the court said: "We have
put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing
else. We have put the source of the obligation where it ought to be. We have
put its source in the law."
8. Glanzer v. Shephard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
9. Marshall v. The New York, N.C., and B. Ry. Co., 138 Eng. Reprint
632 (1851). In a suit by a passenger to recover for the loss of his luggage by
the carrier, it was held unnecessary to allege the carrier-passenger contract,
since the duty to use care existed independently of the contract.
10. Turner v. Stallibras [1898] 1 Q.B. 56.
11. Bohlen, supra note 4.
12. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
13. Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470, 42 Am. Rep. 311 (1882) (a defective scaffold); Statler v. George A. Ray Mfg. Co., 195 N.Y. 478, 88 N.E. 1063 (1909) (a
defective coffee urn).
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necessary for the manufacturer to know of the defect; it is
enough that he negligently failed to detect it."
Many cases have been out of line with this development.
Such a one isCurtainv. Somerset," which is cited as authority by
the principal case. However, it is now doubtful whether Curtain
v. Somerset is authority even in its own jurisdiction.' The principal case also relies heavily upon Cooley on Torts' T to the effect
that privity of contract is necessary for liability. It should be
noted, however, that in the latter part of the section relied upon,
Cooley points out the modifications of the rule and the tendency
18
The principal decision has overlooked ninety-six
to abandon it.
years of development on this principle. It is to be hoped that the
Supreme Court will rectify the Louisiana jurisprudence in this
regard when the question may be presented there.
M.R.

TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-

CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN Co-TORTFEASORS

-In Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. DeJean,l the Supreme Court of Louisiana considered the right of contribution between negligent cotortfeasors who are not co-judgment-debtors. Sandoz, passenger
in an automobile driven by defendant De Jean, was injured in a
collision between that car and another car driven by one Beridon.2
Both Sandoz and De Jean sued Beridon. The Court of Appeal
denied recovery to De Jean because of his own contributory
negligence but gave judgment in favor of Sandoz. Present plaintiff, insurer and subrogee of Beridon, paid Sandoz and then sued
14. MacPherson v. The Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050
(1916); O'Brien v. American Bridge Co. of N.J., 110 Minn. 364, 125 N.W. 1012,
32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 980 (1910), noted (1910) 59 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 47.
15. 140 Pa. 70, 21 Atl. 244 (1891).
16. In Grodsteln v. McGivern, 303 Pa. 555, 154 Atl. 794 (1931) a contractor
was held liable to the wife of the person with whom he had contracted, for
injuries resulting from defective construction. Cf. Griffith v. Atlantic Refining Co., 305 Pa. 386, 157 Atl. 791, 793 (1931): "It is to be noted that the rule
laid down in Curtainv. Somerset has been very much modified by the decision
in Grodstein v. McGivern."
17. 3 Cooley, Law of Torts (4 ed. 1932) § 498.
18. Ibid. citing McLeod v. Linde Air Products Co., 318 Mo. 397, 1 S.W.
(2nd) 122, 126 (1927) where the court says: "We think the exception should
be extended to include 'a thing which when applied to its intended use,
becomes dangerous,' although not inherently so."
1. 185 La. 1074, 171 So. 450 (1936).
2. Sandoz v. Beridon, 150 So. 25 (La. App. 1933).

